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Abstract 
The discussion on the nature of Eros (love as sexual desire) in Plato’s Symposium 
offers us special insights concerning the potential role played by love in social and 
political life. While about Eros, the dialogue also claims to offer a true image of 
Socrates, generating a complex puzzle. This article offers a solution to this puzzle by 
reconstructing and interpreting Plato’s theatrical presentation his argument, making 
use of the structure of the plays of Aristophanes, a protagonist of the Dialogue. The 
new image of Socrates, it is argued, signals Plato’s move beyond the way he 
envisioned so far his master, best visible in his introducing Diotima, a prophetess who 
takes over the role of guide from Socrates; and by presenting the truth about Socrates 
through Alcibiades, cast into the role of a boastful intruder, a central figure in 
Aristophanes’ comedies. Eros and Socrates are both ‘in-between’ or liminal figures, 
indicating that Socrates is still entrapped in the crisis of Athenian democracy. The 
way out, according to the new philosophy of Plato, lies by redirecting Eros from the 
hunting of beautiful objects to be possessed to elevating the soul to the essence of 
beauty as a primary means for further generating beauty, in particular through 
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engendering and educating children, thus reasserting a harmonious co-existence with 
the order of the cosmos. 
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It is a divine affair, this engendering and 
bringing to birth, an immortal element in the 
creature that is mortal; and it cannot occur in 
the discordant. The ugly is discordant with 
whatever is divine, whereas the beautiful is 
accordant  
Plato, Symposium (206C-D) 
 
Our generation is serious – even at banquets 
Kierkegaard, The Present Age 
 
pour comprendre il faut aimer 
Christian Meier, Athens 
 
 
The paradoxes of the Symposium 
 
The Symposium, one of the most widely read dialogues of Plato, is about the theme of 
eros (love).1 At the same time it also pretends to give a – finally – true portrait of 
Socrates. That the two concerns are linked, in the sense that the portrait of Socrates 
offered by Alcibiades parallels the characterisation of Eros by Diotima, is also widely 
accepted since the 1837 work of F.C. Baur (Sider, 1980: 47), and can be traced back 
at least as far as Ficino (Fasce, 1977; see also Hadot, 1993: 98). 
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 At the same time the parallel immediately opens up a Pandora’s box around 
the Dialogue.2 Why did Plato think that the best way to give a truthful description of 
Socrates is by comparing him to Eros? And why put this truthful description of 
Socrates into the mouth of Alcibiades, who is furthermore drunk, and in a particularly 
theatrical scene? 
  
An early victim of the discovery of this Pandora’s box was Kierkegaard, who 
was so much taken by Socrates being a ‘kobold’ (Kierkegaard, 1966) that his entire 
philosophy would be couched in ironical plays and masked self-presentations. Most 
academic commentators were more cautious, refraining from entering this trap of 
theatricality, mis-reading the dialogue as another piece of rational deliberative 
philosophy. This caution was arguably reinforced by a more basic problem posed by 
the dialogue: given that the cycle of dialogues around the death of Socrates was 
devoted to giving a true portrait of Socrates, why did Plato feel the need to provide a 
new, supposedly truer account (see Voegelin, 1957)? 
 
 At this point the problem posed by the paradoxes of the dialogue is joined by 
an even more fundamental dilemma, concerned with the ‘development’ of Plato’s 
thought. In the second half of the 19th century it was established by Lewis Campbell 
that on purely stylistic grounds Plato’s dialogues can be divided into three groups 
(Kahn, 2002: 93-4); a discovery that is still considered as paradigm defining (ibid.: 
100).  The question concerns whether these three groups can also be arranged in a 
chronological order; and whether the perceived need to give a new and ‘truer’ portrait 
of Socrates can be connected to a ‘development’ within Plato’s thinking. In a classic 
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contribution Gregory Vlastos (1991: 45-80) argued that there is indeed a decisive 
difference between the ‘early’ and ‘middle’ Socratic dialogues. The Symposium, 
however, is notoriously difficult to place; and the entire debate is too much caught 
between two, equally unattractive alternative Germanic positions: the idea of an 
unbroken, linear development, a vision developed in Romantic novels 
(Bildungsroman); and the claim, characteristic of philosophical idealism, that Plato’s 
thinking forms a complete and coherent system. 
 
 A way out of this impasse might be reached by taking seriously the manifold 
theatrical allusions contained in the dialogue, and connect them both to the possible 
reasons why Plato felt the need to correct his previous portrait of Socrates and the 
heart of his views concerning eros. If Plato perceived a need to correct his previous 
image, this could only have had one reason: that he changed his mind, to some extent, 
and that therefore the dialogue represents a new and critical view of Socrates. This 
change can account for the heightened theatricality of the dialogue. 
 
 The idea of Plato writing a critique of Socrates challenges so much the 
established wisdom that even those who in the past suggested a similar interpretation 
refrained from drawing the conclusions.3 A reckoning is helped by realising that if 
such an acknowledgment is difficult to make for us today, it was even more difficult 
then for Plato himself. After all, he started his philosophical life by writing an 
Apology of Socrates; and the change did not and could not represent a simple change 
of sides. The respect for his master and much of his position stayed. Thus, the 
formulation of the exact the difference in his position required extreme care. 
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That the dialogue would present a new and unexpected image is Socrates is 
made clear already at the first instance where we encounter him in the dialogue, 
where he appears as washed and wearing sandals (174a3-6), explaining this with the 
claim that he wants to appear handsome at a handsome man’s house – the ‘humorous 
absurdity’ of which being underlined by a threefold play with the word ‘beautiful’ 
(kalos) (Usher, 2002: 221; see also Osborne, 1994). The unusual character of the 
forthcoming portrait is emphasised, still at the start of the dialogue, by two further 
points: Socrates claims knowledge, in opposition to his customary ignorance (177e1-
2); and he is charged with hubris (175e7) (Gagarin, 1977: 26).4 All these features 
would reveal to have a central relevance for the doctrine of eros exposed in the 
dialogue (ibid.) 
 
The central argument of the paper is to show how much Plato’s changed 
portrait of Socrates is linked to his improved understanding of the role of eros in 
public life, as mediated through the new type of theatre, connected to his redefinition 
of the nature of sophistry, as contained in the dialogue Sophist, restored to the centre 
of philosophical attention by Heidegger. It will be argued that the change of position 
of Plato towards his master is linked to a change in his understanding of the factors 
that corrupted Athens, shifting the focus from Sophist rhetoric argumentative 
discussion to the manipulation of images and theatrical performances, especially the 
evocative manipulation of sexual desire in comedies, and the recognition that the 
erotic practices accepted by Socrates, even connected to pedagogy, were part and 
parcel of this culture, promoted and manipulated by the Sophists, though existing 
before. Thus the break that Socrates tried to establish with the Sophists was not 
	   7	  
sufficient, and the dialogue, especially through the figure of Diotima, shows how 
Plato embarked on this new understanding of Eros.  
 
Before a detailed analysis of the dialogue, however, it is necessary to review 
the state of the art on its theatrical aspects. 
 
Theatricality in the Symposium 
 
One of the main differences between Plato’s earlier and later writings concern his new 
understanding about the dangers of theatre. In the early dialogues the main 
interlocutors and adversaries of Socrates are the Sophists as rhetoricians. In the later 
works, however, Plato clearly seems to imply that the most important instruments of 
Athens’ decline were developments within the theatre, relying on performative 
manipulation of images. He recognised that dramatic poets rhapsodes can have an 
even more destructive influence than the debates provoked by Sophists in the agora, 
as the effect mechanism of the theatre is more powerful: they ‘combined ignorance 
with a unique capacity to inflict a particular kind of psychological damage on both 
themselves and those who executed and witnessed dramatic performances’ (Emlyn-
Jones, 2004: 391-2). This is especially true for comedy which is strongly concerned 
with sex (Sider, 1980: 48), thus responsible for proliferating vulgarity and 
licentiousness. This new understanding is reflected in the Sophist, where Sophists are 
characterised through their dealing with non-Being through the evocative use of 
images. Even further, in the Laws Plato outright introduces a new type of political 
rule, theatrocracy (Laws 700D-1A; see Emlyn-Jones, 2004: 389; Sider, 1980: 53). As 
Plato makes it clear, the problem is not with theatre per se, especially not with 
classical tragedy (this is why he never confronted directly the great classic 
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playwrights), rather with the confusion characteristic of his present: that ‘with the 
progress of time’ poets, ‘through their folly’, being ‘frenzied and unduly possessed by 
a spirit of pleasure’, unintentionally ‘bore false witness’ against their own profession 
(Laws 700D-E). 
 
 This is the context in which the significance of the theatrical aspects of the 
Symposium, this crucial transitory dialogue, can be best recognised. Here theatrical 
elements so much ‘pervade the dialogue’ that it could be outright considered as a 
‘drama’ (Sider, 1980: 48). Most particular is that it is tightly connected to the ‘true’ 
portrait of Socrates; as ‘all the undesirable imagery of competition and emotional 
excess associated by Plato with the drama is redirected towards the goal of true 
knowledge and understanding of reality embodied in the persona of his Socrates’ 
(Emlyn-Jones, 2004: 403). 
 
The use of such elements is most unusual for Plato. Apart from the 
Symposium, the only other dialogue where men of the theatre directly appear is the 
Ion (Emlyn-Jones, 2004: 392).5 Here, however, in the first part Socrates is not simply 
engaged in a dialogue with his interlocutors, but participates in a staged contest; while 
the second part, with the sudden entry of the drunken Alcibiades, is purely theatrical – 
though it is exactly the scene which is supposed to reveal the truth about Socrates. 
While this scene is undoubtedly ‘theatrical’ or ‘performative’, one must be very 
precise concerning the exact kind of performative action that goes on here – indeed, in 
the entire dialogue. In this regard a number of helpful hints are contained in the 
existing literature – though they must be complemented by an excursus about the 
origins of comedy. 
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 The first question concerns the exact kind of theatre that is performed in this 
dialogue. It is certainly not a tragedy, but is not a comedy either. This suggests the 
possibility of a satyr play – and indeed a number of indications point to this direction 
(see Sider, 1980; and in particular Usher, 2002). After all, the last three speakers of 
the contest are Aristophanes, the famous comedy writer; Agathon, whose victory at a 
tragedy competition gives the occasion for the banquet; and Socrates, who is 
characterised by Alcibiades as Silenus, an arch satyr and tutor of Dionysus. 
Furthermore, it has been recently discovered that the closest models for the dialogue 
are provided by the myth of King Midas capturing Silenus, and the Cyclops of 
Euripides, the only surviving satyr play of the tragedian (Usher, 2002: 205-6) – a 
piece where Euripides ‘pokes fun at the Athenian pederastic ideal’ (ibid.: 221). 
Taking further this link between the satyrs and Dionysus, it has also been advanced 
that the dialogue can be best understood as a Dionysian festivity, while the text also 
incorporates Dithyrambic speeches (Sider, 1980: 41, 51-2).  
 
 Dithyrambs and satyr plays, however, just as Dionysian festivities in general, 
are considered to be at the origins of theatre since Aristotle’s Poetics. In this respect it 
is most important that Plato finishes the dialogue by Socrates trying to convince his 
remaining interlocutors (exactly Aristophanes and Agathon) that ‘the knowledge 
required for writing tragedy and comedy’ is the same (Symposium 223d3-6). Such 
references can’t be considered as accidental. In order to understand the reasons for 
Plato’s allusion to the common origins of tragedy and comedy, we need to insert a 
short overview of this theme. 
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 This can be done with the help of Francis Cornford’s classical analysis 
concerning this common structural characteristics of both tragedy and comedy, to be 
traced back to the structure of the ritual out of which they grew, and for which he 
considered the plays of Aristophanes, in particular the Clouds, as offering perfect 
examples (Cornford, 1914).6 According to Cornford, this structure consists of two 
parts: a contest, which originally dramatised the replacement of the old year with the 
new; and a celebratory feast. In between the two, there is a peculiar intermezzo called 
parabasis (‘a move forward’), in which the Chorus stepped forward and directly 
addressed the audience. This represented a deliberate play with boundaries, as it broke 
the spell of the spectacle, while managing to involve even more strongly the audience. 
Finally, and most importantly, at the start of the second part the festive celebrations 
were interrupted, literally, by the bursting onto the scene of an ‘intruder’ (alazon) who 
appeared out of the blue, trying to capture attention and dominate the feast, stealing 
the show. This figure has two main characteristics: he is not invited to the feast; and 
he tries to make up for this, and gain favours, by being boastful. These features have 
fundamental significance for understanding why Plato placed his ‘conclusive’ 
characterisation in the mouth of Alcibiades, who would indeed interrupt the 
symposium, and whose supposed presentation of the ‘truth’ about Socrates is thus 
revealed as mere boasting. 
 
 Finally, this structure also helps to identify the speech of Socrates containing 
the teachings of Diotima about eros as a kind of parabasis: a direct talk, out of Plato’s 
heart, in contrast to the theatrical set-up of the rest of the dialogue. It cannot be 
emphasised enough how, given the unusual characterisation of Socrates and the 
similarly unusual theatrical set-up of the dialogue, important it is that – as another 
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major upsetting of all conventions – this parabasis is delivered by a woman, who is 
furthermore a prophetess and a foreigner.7 In order to offer a conclusive analysis of 
eros Plato here ‘invents a woman to answer the previous speakers, whose 
downplaying generation, offspring, and children is consistent with their 
homosexuality’ (Nichols, 2004: 198). Her being a stranger underlines the radical 
contrast with the Athenian male scenery; while the emphasis on being a prophetess 
might be connected to the role of priestesses and prophetesses in Minoan Crete,8 
shedding some light on the major importance Crete would play in the last dialogues. 
 
Matters of context and framing 
 
As this already indicates, matters of style and content cannot be separated for the 
Symposium. This impression is further reinforced by indications concerning the 
broader context and the concrete framing of the dialogue. 
 
 The first issue of context concerns the kind of feast that is represented by the 
Symposium. At one level, it seems to be just a normal banquet, with speeches – the 
only difference concerning the importance of the people who participate, and their 
ideas. However, as Pierre Hadot perceptively observed, ‘in a manner that for us is 
rather mysterious, Plato in the Symposium placed a full constellation of Dionysian 
symbols around Socrates’ (Hadot, 1993: 113). The links between Dionysus, Socrates 
and theatrical allusions will provide a guiding thread for this paper. 
 
 Second, this is one of the few dialogues where the events can be dated to 416 
BC (Emlyn-Jones, 2004: 395). This has its importance for understanding the role to 
be played by Alcibiades, as the disastrous Sicilian expedition instigated and led by 
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him took place in 415-13 BC. As Alcibiades was a student of Socrates, even a 
particularly important one, such a rare, precise allusion can only be interpreted as a 
way to underline the failure of the mission of Socrates to educate Alcibiades. 
 
Even more important are the stylistic devices that were deployed throughout, 
but concentrated in particular at the beginning of the Dialogue. This starts with two 
particularly circuitous loops: the first concerns the ways in which the dialogue was 
preserved, while the second the events that led to the start of the feast – from the 
perspective of Socrates.  
 
The events of the famous symposium with the various speeches on love are 
recalled through a complicated chain of transmission. Apollodorus and Glaucon, the 
first two characters spend quite some time in sorting out who told what about when 
the events took place (172A-4A). Such an elevated degree of mediation places 
emphasis on the importance of memory and the fight against forgetting, a central 
message of Plato’s philosophy, to be traced to the last words of Socrates: ‘do not 
forget’ (Phaedo 118A). That such a context is intended is also rendered evident at the 
other end of the dialogue, where the scenery, including the evocation of the cock, 
according to Hadot (1993: 108), following Nietzsche, recalls the death of Socrates 
(Symposium 223C-D). The question now concerns the meaning of such a reference 
here, given that the cycle devoted to the death of Socrates has already been finished. 
 
 Some hints toward the solution are provided by two clear references to the 
Republic, connected to the personality of Glaucon, Plato’s brother and one of the 
main interlocutors of the Republic (see also Osborne, 1994: 90-1). Here he only 
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makes a quick appearance at the very start, just as he would also appear again shortly 
in the Parmenides, another dialogue of the middle period Plato, devoted to his other 
former teacher, who failed to recognise fully the depth of the problem of not-Being, 
which would be the main theme of the Sophist. The second reference is to Phaleron, 
the old port of Athens, in contrast to Piraeus, the new port, where the start of the 
Republic takes place, with Socrates taking a walk there with Glaucon. From a 
‘modernist’ perspective, that would indicate the significance of the Republic, in 
contrast to the Symposium; but Plato was a believer in the value of traditions, and this 
dialogue in particular started and ended with a tribute to memory, so it can only mean 
that here Plato starts to descend into the layers of a tradition that runs even deeper 
than the one animating the Republic; while at the same time the direction of the walk, 
in contrast to the Republic, is an ascent, from the port towards the city (Osborne, 
1994: 88-9, 96-7). 
 
 The second loop is concerned with an entire series of circumstances about 
Socrates’s arrival to the banquet that seem to be superfluous and irrelevant but which 
in the context of theatricality suddenly gain meaning, starting with the already 
discussed unusual appearance of Socrates. This complex game of cross-references 
was put in place in order to evoke affinities between the theme of the dialogue (eros 
or Love); the role played in the city by theatre, especially comedy, thus mimetic art in 
general; and the figure of Socrates – in particular the distance Plato starts to perceive 
between his own position and that of his much revered master. A reference back to 
the Republic again helps to clarify the point. There one of the central messages 
concerns a certain kind of ‘love’ as the foundation of a well-ordered city: philia (see 
von Heyking, in this issue).9 Here at stake is another Greek term about love, eros.10 
	   14	  
That the link between the two is intended is also rendered evident by the fact that the 
Phaedrus, a dialogue broadly contemporaneous with the Republic and the Symposium 
explicitly discusses both types of love, and even contains the famous definition of 
philosophy as the love of wisdom (Phaedrus 78D).11 The purpose is to sensitise the 
reader for the manner in which Plato’s overcoming of Socrates would be related, in 
manifold ways, to matters of ‘love’. 
 
 Such references to theatricality and the ‘identity’ of Socrates, beyond the 
picture presented in the Apology, also evoke the Clouds of Aristophanes. This is one 
of the most famous comedies by Aristophanes; it ridicules the Sophists, but also 
presents Socrates as a kind of arch-Sophist. In the Apology Plato argued that this 
comedy played a part in the condemnation of Socrates. Aristophanes, in fact, will be 
one of the banqueters in the Symposium – so special attention will have to be devoted 
to his eventual contributions if we are to understand Plato’s characterization of 
Socrates. 
 
From this perspective a central aspect of these introductory skirmishes, a 
whole series of elaborate points about being or not being invited, starts to gain 
significance. In order to participate in a banquet one first of all must be invited. 
Socrates has been invited to Agathon’s banquet, but Aristodemos wasn’t; so Socrates 
asks him whether he would like to join the banquet uninvited (174B). After a series of 
cracks about the problem of being uninvited, Aristodemos defends himself by saying 
that he is not really uninvited, as Socrates did invite him; but once they arrive at the 
place, Socrates withdraws into one of his famous ecstatic meditations,12 thus imposing 
on Aristodemos the ridiculous experience (174E) of first appearing uninvited at the 
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door, thus as an intruder, an alazon, and then at that embarrassing moment being 
pulled inside by a servant and told that Agathon as host had wanted to invite him but 
just could not find him. They try to drag Socrates inside, though he would only enter 
much later, in the midst of the banquet – practically another intrusion and a serious 
sign of asociality, used as everyone may have been to that kind of behaviour on 
Socrates’s part. 
 
In light of the short sketch given previously about the origins of comedy and 
the role played by the alazon one can also add the conjecture that this complex play 
about being ‘uninvited’ was part of the ‘mysterious’ connection mentioned by Hadot 
between the dialogue and comedies. Plato’s elaborate referencing also signals the 
possibility of another, real intruder in the dialogue – and we must try to understand 
the exact meaning of that intrusion as an intrusion once it would happen. 
 
The speeches 
 
The knots between Socrates, eros and theatre are tied even tighter when it is agreed 
that the theme of the speeches at the celebratory banquet will be love (eros); with 
Socrates adding (after making an unusual claim about being expert in matters of love) 
that this would please in particular Aristophanes, who ‘divides his time between 
Dionysos and Aphrodite’ (177E). Thus, through their common interest in matters of 
love, Socrates and Aristophanes, otherwise sworn enemies, come to share a common 
platform. 
 
Once the theme is settled, there come the speeches, of which Socrates’s will 
be the last – the sixth told; however, given that after the first speaker there were a 
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number of others who intervened but whose words were not recalled in the dialogue, 
and so if we take them altogether as one, then his actually would be the seventh; a 
recurrent ‘magic’ number for Plato.13 
 
Plato have already put us on guard concerning the nature and modalities of the 
intervention by Aristophanes. It indeed shows a few crucial features, justifying that 
this paper passes over the others speaking before him, especially as they, though it is 
sometimes argued that they are typical Greek thinking on Eros (Levy, 1979: 285), 
only contain Sophist-inspired commonplaces (Fasce, 1977: 189). Aristophanes was 
supposed to be the third – or ‘fourth’ – speaker, but at the moment he was about to 
speak he started to hiccup, which prevented him talking (185D); something that 
would be repeated twice in the dialogue. In their speeches, both Aristophanes and 
then Agathon launch a eulogy in praise of Love; so when his turn finally comes, 
Socrates starts by revealing his state of helplessness (aporein), caused by the fact that 
he is not interested in praising Eros, only in the truth about Love. His contribution 
consists of two parts, both frustrating the expectation of giving a speech: a first, very 
short, following his usual method of asking questions; and a second recounting the 
teaching of Diotima, a woman from Mantinea, a place in Arcadia bearing a name 
recalling the word prophet (manteia), and identifying her as a prophetess whose name 
means ‘honouring the divine’.14 
 
The short question and answer session serves to set the tone for Socrates’s 
whole contribution, identifying Love at a first approximation as the love of beauty, 
but also introducing the idea that beauty is therefore something the person who is in 
love does not possess – even though this does not mean that he is necessarily ugly. 
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This point leads into Diotima’s speech, which starts by presenting Eros as being 
situated in the in-between, or metaxy,15 thus in a state of tension. 
  
After introducing the in-between nature of Love, Diotima tells a story about 
the birth of Eros, including his conception on the birthday of Aphrodite by Poros 
(resource, passage) and Penia (lack, poverty).16 This helps her to qualify the meaning 
of the love of beauty: it is a desire to possess what is good – and forever. Yet, beauty 
will not be displaced by the search for the good, rather only change its location from 
being reduced to an object of desire to matters of more basic significance. Diotima 
also introduces a new idea about the ‘method’ to pursue this aim, or the nature of the 
effort that is love: it is the giving birth or begetting [tokos] ‘in the beautiful, in relation 
both to body and to soul’ (206b9-10). Now, the term for giving birth or begetting is 
actually the word which also connotes a woman’s delivery of a baby into the world; 
so the metaphor uses fully the possibilities offered by a woman ‘delivering’ a speech 
– and Socrates in fact immediately alludes to this, even to Diotima herself, as he states 
that its understanding requires prophetic gifts (manteias) (206b11). It is well known 
that Socrates, especially in the Theaetetus, is presented as a midwife. Here, however, 
it is beauty itself that plays the role of midwife (Nichols, 2004: 198); perhaps 
clarifying while Socrates is presented here as trying to look beautiful. 
 
 The ensuing lack of understanding on the part of Socrates, which here might 
be genuine and not just a usual dialectical technique, allows Diotima to add a number 
of crucial clarifications. First, all human beings are pregnant, meaning that they want 
to give birth to, or bring to light, things that are beautiful. Through Diotima, Plato 
emphasises the similarity and not difference between body and soul, the word 
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‘delivery’ evoking the joint need for men and women. Such begetting and delivery, 
however, can only happen in beauty, and not in ugliness: ‘It is a divine affair, this 
engendering and bringing to birth, an immortal element in the creature that is mortal; 
and it cannot occur in the discordant. The ugly is discordant with whatever is divine, 
whereas the beautiful is accordant’ (206C-D). Thus, a pregnant being can only give 
birth when seeing something beautiful, thus becoming full with joy and delight; while 
the sight of something ugly forces it to persist with its burden. This part is concluded 
when Diotima explicitly refutes Socrates: ‘For you are wrong, Socrates, in supposing 
that love is of the beautiful [rather it is] of engendering and begetting upon the 
beautiful’ (206E).17 From this it also follows that love implies a desire for 
immortality. 
 
At this point there is a clear break in the story; a plateau is reached. Socrates 
states that he received this instruction from Diotima in a number of different 
discussions; but once she went further. On this occasion, Diotima started by referring 
to the behaviour of animals when they desire to beget.18 The desire for procreation, 
and the longing for newborn is again connected to the wish for immortality; the 
overcoming of oblivion (207D-8A). Such feelings are characteristic as much of the 
body as of the soul; and in some men, this is expressed by love for women, while in 
others it is through a desire to guide the state. So after a time, by continuously 
elevating oneself, one may arrive at beholding an ‘ocean [pelagos] of the beautiful’ 
(210d3-4), contemplating it in its full splendour. 
  
This is an extremely captivating image; yet, instead of giving us a rest here, 
Diotima/Plato does the exact opposite, asking now for our full attention – as evidently 
	   19	  
the culminating stage of her narrative is upon us.19 Once reaching this ‘ocean of 
beauty’, in progression towards the ultimate aims of the ‘science of love’, one accedes 
to a ‘wondrous vision, beautiful in its nature’ (210e6), demonstrating ‘the very 
essence of beauty’ (211d1). This vision can only be accessed by taking the right steps, 
as if on a ladder, following a single road – which is ‘the right method of 
paiderasthein’ (211b7).  
 
The risky business of altering the meaning of words 
 
It is on purpose that I did not translate the last word, as understanding the reasons why 
Plato chose to use it presents no small difficulty. The term existed at that time, in a 
somewhat similar sense as in current English, being part of the vocabulary of Sophist 
education, often derided by the comedy-writers.  This, however, could not have been 
the meaning intended by Plato, as he was rather interested in the right method of 
paiderasthein. Thus, we need to consider the semantic complexity evoked by the 
Greek words pais and paidiou. The former means a child, whether male or female, 
about 7-14 years old; while the latter implies one younger than seven. Paideia as a 
noun means childhood or youth, and by implication education as well, but it also 
means culture, while the closely related word paidia means play or game, but also 
entertainment and joking. Paiderasthein therefore literally means a love of young 
children, but also a love of playfulness and of culture. This is the type of education to 
which, through Diotima, Plato wanted to return, taking the risk of altering the 
meaning of a word that has gained a connotation that Plato found particularly 
problematic.20 But why take this risk? 
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Here we need to recall that the point regarding paiderasthein was made in the 
most emphatic manner possible, as Diotima asked Socrates for ‘the very best of [his] 
attention’ (210E). It therefore could not have been unintended, and had to be at the 
heart of both Plato’s interest in the question of Eros, and central to the distance he 
started to perceive between the position of Socrates in this respect and his own. 
  
The answer must lie in the fact that the tight etymological connections 
between the Greek words for child, playing, education and culture go at the heart of 
Greek culture (Jaeger, 1945) suggesting the reason why Greece exerted such an 
impact at the level of history, and still exerts such a fascination at the level of ideas. 
Greece is the source of the Renaissance, the home of political thought and philosophy, 
the origin of law and architecture, painting and sculpture, as we know them; the 
history of science, culture, politics, society and art is inconceivable without the 
contribution of the Greeks. Given that all this is fundamentally connected to the 
search for knowledge, and that such a search for knowledge is inseparable from 
education, this specific semantic figuration around the root pais must have played a 
crucial role in the formation of the specific characteristic of Greek civilization – 
confirmed by the fact that the Greeks used this term to capture culture. Furthermore, 
the problem that Plato perceived around the corrosive influence of Eros on the polity, 
through comedy and the philosophical ‘education’ provided by ‘pederasty’, involved 
the joint corrosion of the three aspects of Athenian culture for which it is most 
renowned up to our days: political democracy, philosophy, and tragic theatre. In order 
to restore the integrity of Athens, Plato could not shy away from the heart of the 
problem where Socrates failed to make a difference: pederastic education. 
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 Plato tried to re-capture the original Greek concern with education, by 
restoring the meaning of the word paiderasthein.21 Diotima emphasized the metaphor 
of conception, pregnancy and giving birth, and such metaphors – which emphatically 
were about the joint contribution of male and female parts – could easily be continued 
by the metaphor of playful and loving childrearing, thus paiderasthein. The effect, 
however, turned out to be the exact opposite, and not only in classical times, but also 
in the Renaissance when, through Ficino’s De Amore, written under the shadow cast 
by Chrysoloras, the idea of ‘watching and loving beautiful boys’, thanks especially to 
Michelangelo, again became understood as the method of acceding to beauty (see 
Szakolczai, 2007, 2013). Thus, Plato’s attempt to transcend the Sophist-justified 
pederasty backfired, leading to the interpretation of Plato’s philosophy as supporting a 
kind of pederasty – a misreading that proved to be impossible to eradicate, up to our 
very days. 
 
The essence of beauty 
 
Returning to Plato, by raising oneself ‘as on the rungs of a ladder’ (211C), one can 
finally accede to the contemplation of the ‘very essence of beauty’ – which is the only 
thing that makes life worthwhile (211D). And if one contemplates all this beauty in 
the right kind of manner, one will ‘breed not illusions but true examples of virtue’ 
(212A), and thus will reach – through offspring, both physical and spiritual – 
immortality. In this famous passage Plato shifts the centre of beauty from a 
characteristic of objects to be possessed to an overarching quality of the surrounding 
world, in the original sense of cosmos, which becomes conducive to the generation 
and thus furthering of beauty, in both spiritual and material sense, not being reduced 
to the creation of works of art, but including all the objects in the world around us, 
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focusing in particular on the engendering and education of children. This is indeed the 
central core of Plato’s new philosophy, which recognises the transformative power of 
love, moving beyond the forcing of a conversion to the good, characteristic of the 
Republic (Barney, 2008; Fasce, 1977: 184-9). A proper turning around must be 
produced by the combination of Eros as a moving force and a search for beauty as 
central aspect of the entire environment that surrounds one’s life.  
 
The intruder arrives 
 
The moment Socrates concluded his account of Diotima’s talk two things happened. 
First Aristophanes wanted to say something, no doubt given that he understood 
himself directly targeted; but before he could open his mouth, the feast was 
interrupted by the drunken voice of Alcibiades – and thus for the second time he was 
prevented from talking. Thus, again smuggled into the context of a direct reference to 
Aristophanes, we have the event that the frequent allusions to comedy made us 
expect: after the end of the first part, meaning here the speech of Socrates, the intruder 
or alazon appears (Cornford, 1914: 129-40); a favourite trick of Aristophanes, though 
here he happens to be the one who is interrupted.  
 
Before going into the content of the speech by Alcibiades, we must interpret at 
this crucial point the two most peculiar stylistic devices deployed by Plato: the 
sensitisation to the problem of turning up uninvited at a feast, or the figure of the 
Alazon; and the reason why Aristophanes is repeatedly deprived of the possibility of 
speech. In the Clouds Socrates as a Sophist is the alazon, who intrudes everywhere 
and bothers everybody. Alcibiades describes Socrates as Eros, but this demon-deity, 
just as the Hermes of Lysis, according to von Heyking (in this issue), is itself an 
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intruding force, a windfall who pounces on humans; and, even further, Alcibiades is 
giving an image of Socrates as Eros while being an intruder. All this seems to suggest 
that Plato now sides with Aristophanes. This, however, is clearly denied by the other 
main device, Aristophanes being repeatedly prevented from speaking. Furthermore, 
when he eventually talks, he delivers an eulogy of Eros as the greatest benefactor of 
mankind (189C), who should be the guide of humans towards happiness, thus talking 
as a genuine Sophist, underlined by his profession as a comedy writer, whom Plato in 
his last period considered as particularly responsible for the collapse of Athens, due to 
its irresponsible inciting of Eros. The real corrupters of Athens are the Sophists and 
the comedy-writers; however, signals Plato, Socrates cannot be considered as immune 
to this process; he failed to find the right way of combining Eros and education, 
offered here by Diotima. 
 
Alcibiades offers two series of remarks. Both are of exceptional interest; and 
of surprising, even striking quality, especially through the parallel with Diotima’s 
characterisation of Eros. The first one is offered half-jokingly, right after his drunken 
entry, during which he failed to notice that Socrates was also present. Alcibiades 
begins by describing Socrates as a typical Sophist: one who is always lying in wait 
(213B-C); performing his ‘old trick’ of turning up suddenly, at places where he is 
least expected (213C); and one who successfully intrigues (diemékhanésó, 213c5, 
evoking the word mechaniota, a term indicating the Trickster) in order to get a seat 
near the most handsome person. According to Osborne (1994: 93-101), these recall 
the features of Eros that he obtained from his father, Poros (resource), while the 
second characterisation evokes the traits that Eros inherited from his mother, Penia 
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(need). Before these second, equally shocking series of remarks, however, he states 
that he won’t simply ‘praise’ Socrates, but will tell the truth (214E). 
  
Alcibiades starts the second part of his discourse by saying that he will tell the 
truth about Socrates not directly but by way of similitudes, or images (eikonón); and 
while Socrates might think that this is in order to deride him, it will be done for the 
sake of truth (215A). The images indeed are striking, as the two recurrent metaphors 
are Silenus and the satyrs (215B, 216D, 221D). Being compared to these figures is 
generally not considered praise, as both are considered wild and incontinent.22 They 
are also closely associated with the birth of theatre, especially comedy, as comedy is 
considered to have grown out of the satyr play, which was performed in classical 
times as the fourth part of the dramatic cycle. Thus, after being described, half-
jokingly, as a Sophist, Socrates is now characterised, quite seriously, as a figure of 
comedy. 
  
Now Alcibiades must give an account of his images, and he proceeds 
promptly. He suggests that the effect mechanism of Socrates’ speeches can be 
compared to a theatrical performance, as he manages to enchant, or entrance, by the 
simple power of his speeches, unaided by instruments (215C-E). This effective 
power, however, is exerted for a good reason: Socrates manages to generate a sense of 
shame.  This worked even on Alcibiades (216B), though the effect was not lasting, as 
the moment Socrates left the scene, the allure and power of pleasing the crowd again 
took hold of him. 
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At this point, Alcibiades introduces a major difference between Socrates and 
Silenus; while outward Socrates is ignorant like Silenus, inside he knows the measure 
(216D). In order to demonstrate this, Alcibiades proceeds to tell a true story – and 
asks all those not initiated to close their ears (218B). This is about the way he tried 
but failed to seduce Socrates, even though the latter was attracted by him. 
  
Alcibiades declared that he wanted to tell the truth about Socrates, and implied 
these words of truth as a praise. However, by now we have learned not to take 
anything at face value in this dialogue. Eros was also praised by all speakers until 
Socrates, through Diotima, revealed the real truth. The praises offered about Socrates 
by Alcibiades are just as problematic, though there is nobody there who could draw 
such conclusion, as such an explicit point cannot be offered by Plato. He makes it 
evident by making another use of his favourite device: Alcibiades is also interrupted, 
this time by a group of drunkards (223B). Thus we are left on our own to make up our 
mind about the true valour of Socrates’s attitude as exposed – and the history of 
philosophy does not offer us an encouraging view concerning success.  
 
Conclusion: The limits of the Socratic ‘method’ 
 
The limits of the Socratic method cannot be reduced to the well-known fact that Plato 
failed to make use the method of elenchus in the late dialogues, but extend to the 
more fundamental question of Socrates as exemplary teacher. For us today the 
question is both extremely simple and impossibly difficult, almost untouchable. It is 
simple, as nobody in his right mind suggests that male teachers should seduce their 
young male students – quite on the contrary, even the idea is prohibited by law. But it 
is also impossibly difficult, as – in so far as Socrates and his example is concerned – 
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by raising questions one has to confront an entire tradition, just as the ruling opinion 
of our days. 
 
 Socrates realised, like nobody else, that his much-beloved Athens, at the 
height of its glory, somehow lost its ways and spirit, took the wrong turn, and was 
precipitating into an abyss. He went around the city, talking to all kind of people, 
trying to force them to confront their own situation, face the moral corruptness of 
their ways of doing, and in particular went to the agora to confront the Sophists, 
whom he considered as the main source of these ills. At the end, he was put to death, 
paradoxically as a Sophist, as he was regularly in their company, and created more 
trouble than the smooth-talking Sophists who could not care less than the right ways 
of the city. It is this Socratic project of the social critic trying to force a turnaround in 
the behaviour of the citizens that reached its apotheosis in the Republic. 
 
 However, over time Plato gained a different, deeper understanding about the 
crisis of his city. The really dangerous ‘Sophists’ were not those who argued in the 
marketplace, but those who captured a much wider audience, and thus inflicted much 
more damage, through the power of images, or image-magic (itself the central effect 
mechanism of Sophist speeches), and the performances of enchanting songs and 
plays. Central to this was the evocation of Eros, the luring of audiences, thus the 
entire citizenry, into the pursuit of pleasures, especially erotic gratification. Here the 
problem with Socrates was not simply that his diagnosis was insufficient, but that he 
failed to problematise the erotic practices of his city, and – even worse – accepted the 
widespread mixing of education with the seduction of the students. 
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 The true greatness of Plato, however, was not simply to move beyond his 
master, without feeling the need to voice an explicit critique, but that he managed to 
envelop this overcoming into the dialogue that at the same time presented his new 
philosophy, focusing on the converting power of a special combination of beauty and 
love.  
 
 Plato is our contemporary, arguably the most relevant philosopher for our 
problems, comparable only to Nietzsche, given that we today face the same kind of 
situation, with various forms of Sophistic dominating public and intellectual life, 
where the combination of politics, power and sex, so well perceived by Foucault, 
plays a particularly strong role in contemporary moral corruptness and voluntary 
slavery (Chaignot, 2010). The Symposium, a kind of prelude to the height of his 
thinking, offers us two vital insights: first, a critical forcing of changing ways is not 
only insufficient, but counterproductive; and second, the force of love and beauty can 
indeed be incorporated into the production of such a turnaround, but only if this is 
oriented not towards gratification and possession, but the engendering and education 
of children under conditions that are dominated by a care for overall beauty. 
 
 
 
Notes 	  
1. Given the wide difference in meaning between Greek eros and English ‘love’, 
I’ll use the Greek word throughout the paper. Capitalised Eros will denote the 
deity, in contrast to eros as a concept for sexual desire – though such a 
distinction arguably was by no means that clear for the Greeks. 
	   28	  
	  
2. Recently the portrait of Socrates in the Symposium was indeed paralleled to 
Pandora; see Kenaan (2009). 
3. See the conclusions to the otherwise excellent papers by Emlyn-Jones (2004: 
404-5), Gagarin (1977: 36-7), or Usher (who outright considers the dialogue 
as after all apologetic; see 2002: 225-6). Cornford, however, takes up a similar 
position: ‘I adopted the view that Diotima’s words to Socrates […] indicate 
that Plato is going behind the historical Socrates’ (Cornford, 1950: 79). For a 
similar argument concerning Plato’s problematisation of Socrates, see Bonner 
(in this issue). 
4. According to Gagarin (1977: 25), the significance of this point is underlined 
by the fact that in the dialogue the term hubris and its derivatives appear no 
less than eight times. 
5. About Plato’s use of theatrical language and terminology in general, see 
Charalabopoulos (2000). 
6. Francis Cornford was a major Plato scholar and also a ‘Cambridge ritualist’ 
(Calder, 1991). In contrast to Fritz Graf’s rather summary dismissal of his 
work (Graf, 2006), and in line with a growing reappraisal of the ‘Cambridge 
ritualists’, I would argue that his work is rather strikingly fresh and relevant. 
7. This points towards the role to be played by the Stranger, replacing Socrates, 
in the Sophist and the Statesman, two crucial late dialogues. 
8. For further details, see Szakolczai (2007). 
9. Incidentally, the term ‘friend’, just as the etymologically related ‘free’, 
etymologically also meant love, but in the contemporary language this 
connection is no longer visible. 
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10. The third Greek word denoting love is agape, originally referring to a general 
affection related for e.g. to a feast, and through the New Testament came to 
denote the divine love. 
11. See Seung (1995). 
12. See also 220D here; for more details, Hadot (1993: 114). 
13. Another way to count the speeches is to stay with six speakers, but with 
Socrates delivering two, thus Diotima’s being the seventh. 
14. Note that this repeats the mediatedness that already characterised the start of 
the dialogue. 
15. This term would become central for Eric Voegelin (1978). 
16. In his book on Giambattista Tiepolo, together with Raphael the greatest 
Platonic painter, Roberto Calasso gives a fascinating account on the genealogy 
and veneration of Eros. According to this, the question of Eros’s father was 
always considered as being particularly problematic – the mother usually 
being identified with Aphrodite – leading to the idea that he was ‘nobody, son 
of nobody’ (Calasso, 2006: 266). 
17. This statement should not be considered as mere rhetoric, but as an implicit 
critique of the Republic, where Plato/Socrates still adhered to such a position, 
having a dualistic vision of Eros (see 458C-D; for details, see Barney, 2008: 
12-3). 
18. While prehistoric cave paintings never depict animals coupling, they are often 
represented – for e.g. in some famous images in Lascaux – in the state of 
excitement that takes hold of them before. 
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19. I would like to stress here strongly this special call for attention, as it is much 
quite different from a mere rhetorical device. Instead of allowing us to relax at 
a moment of evident climax, it specifically asks for more attention. 
20. For a similar argument that Plato wanted to challenge here the accepted 
perspectives, see Brisson (2006). 
21. This might arguably explain Plato’s sudden rise of interest in the true meaning 
of words, a central theme of Cratylus, a dialogue written around the time of 
the Symposium, and also associated with Ion. 
22. On Silenus, see in particular Kerenyi (1986). In the Statesman satyrs would be 
assigned a unequivocally negative value, and used as a central metaphor for 
the ills of Athenian political life. 
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